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With the submission of Tarapore II report on capital account convertibility, the 
issue is once again topical. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by arguing 
that one of the potential collateral benefits of financial globalization is reduction in 
inflation. The above argument is supported by both developing a theoretical model 
and empirical analysis. The paper establishes that the threat of capital outflow in the 
face of loose monetary policy acts as a strong deterrent for such policies. Looking 
specifically at the Indian case, the paper finds that financial integration since mid 90s 
has exercised some degree of “disciplinary effect” and helped to curb inflation. The 
paper points out that before proceeding for greater capital account convertibility 
issues like fiscal discipline and appropriate exchange rate regime need to be 
addressed.  
 
It is hoped that this working paper will help policymakers and stakeholders to 
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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between capital account openness and 
inflation since the 1980s. It argues that widespread capital account liberalization 
during the last two decades appears to have contributed to the worldwide disinflation 
observed during the same period. The paper builds a theoretical model to motivate the 
presence of a negative link between financial integration and inflation. It tests the 
prediction of the theoretical model by employing static and dynamic panel data 
procedures. Financial integration appears to discipline monetary authorities, or to help 
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Over the last two decades, a large number of developed and developing countries 
have become more open and integrated with the rest of the world. Both the volume and 
nature of international capital flow have radically altered during this period. In the 1970s, 
international borrowing and lending was primarily made up of foreign aid or official 
finance for developing countries. However, with the liberalization of capital and 
investment controls during the 1980s and 1990s, the vast majority of international capital 
now comes from private investors, through capital markets (such as sales of bonds and 
equities) and international investment by multinational companies.  
 
During the early 1990s, there was a growing belief that relaxing restraints on 
movement of capital would yield benefits similar to liberalized trade. It was believed that 
free movement of capital can have several important benefits for the domestic economy. 
It led to overall improved international allocative efficiency. In particular, it created 
opportunities for portfolio diversification, consumption smoothing, risk sharing and 
intertemporal trade. By holding claims on foreign countries, agents could protect 
themselves against adverse shocks affecting home country alone. Thus, increased capital 
mobility raised the risk adjusted rates of return, which in turn encouraged higher savings 
and investment, leading to faster rates of growth. An open capital account also induced 
policymakers to undertake and adhere to good policies. The threat of capital outflow, in 
the face of opportunistic policies, acted as a “discipline effect” for the policymakers. 
 
However, a spate of financial crises in the 1990s forced policymakers to rethink 
the strategy of unbridled capital flows. The countries, which were worst affected by these 
crisis, were the ones which had opened up capital inflows. As a result, several economists 
have pointed out that unrestrained capital flows can act as a serious impediment to global 
financial stability and have called for the imposition of capital controls like Tobin Tax on 
trade in international assets. 
 
In recent years, several economists have pointed out that it is highly likely that the 
major benefits of successful financial liberalization are primarily indirect. Successful 
financial liberalization acts as a catalyst for growth by imposing discipline on 
macroeconomic policies, promoting development of the financial sector and exposing 
domestic firms to competition from foreign competitors. Thus freer movement of capital 
flows tend to generate a number of, what Kose et al. (2006) term as “potential collateral 
benefits” of financial integration. 
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would also like to thank Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito for providing me with their index on capital account 
liberalization. Financial assistance from the Graduate Division of University of California, Santa Cruz, is 
acknowledged with thanks. All the remaining errors are mine. 
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In this paper, we look at the validity of the one such benefit. In particular, we 
focus on how opening up the capital account has affected inflation across a wide range of 
countries. In the past two decades, the world observed two distinct international 
economic trends. First, there was global disinflation, with inflation rates falling on 
average even in countries which had a history of high inflation like some Latin American 
countries. Secondly, several countries liberalized their capital account, despite warnings 
of the risks of currency and banking crises. In this paper, we investigate whether these 
two events were related? The paper builds a theoretical model, which predicts that 
opening up of the capital significantly lowers the policymakers’ incentive to generate an 
inflationary shock. The paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence for a strong 
negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation. It goes on to argue 
that opening up the capital account disciplines the monetary authorities as it raises the 
penalties for loose monetary policy. By opening up the capital account, policymakers also 
impart a signal to the private sector that it is willing to suffer the punishment of loose 
monetary policy in the form of capital outflow. Thus it alters the private sector 
expectations about the future monetary policy, which in itself can be inflation reducing. 
 
Figure 1 below motivates the main idea of the paper by plotting average rate of 
inflation in the last two decades (measured on a logarithmic scale) and the average capital 
account openness for 163 countries.
1 Figure 1 shows a strong negative relationship 
between capital account openness and inflation.  
 
 
Figure 1: Capital Account Openness and Inflation (1980-2003) 
 
 
                                                  
1   The index on capital account openness has been taken from Chinn and Ito (2005). 
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The primary channel through which capital account openness affects inflation is 
through its impact on the elasticity of demand for money. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) 
argue that by liberalizing the capital account, governments boost foreign and domestic 
investor confidence. On the other hand, capital account liberalization directly raises the 
penalty for loose monetary policy. Easier access to foreign exchange raises the elasticity 
of demand for money, and makes the monetary authority vulnerable to rapid reserve 
losses. In a flexible exchange rate regime, loss of reserves is not that important, but rapid 
currency depreciations can also be inflationary. By signaling that it is willing to raise the 
penalties for loose monetary policy, the policymaker alters the private sector expectations 
regarding future monetary policy. This reduces the temptation to print excess money and 
lowers the time consistent inflation rate.  
 
Grilli et al. (1991) find that countries with less independent central banks resort to 
capital controls. In these countries, the governments by controlling the monetary policy 
directly can impose a higher levy, when capital controls are in place. Using empirical 
methods, the paper finds a negative relationship between central bank independence and 
inflation. These two conclusions together imply that capital controls are associated with 
higher inflation rates.  
 
In another study, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) look at a panel of 61 developing 
and developed countries. They conclude that restrictions on capital account transactions 
tend to be associated with higher inflation, a higher share of seignorage revenue in total 
revenue, and lower real interest rates. Razin and Yuen (1995) show that the slope of the 
Phillips curve (inflation output tradeoff) becomes steeper in the presence of capital 
controls. This is due to a lower semi-elasticity of demand for money, and absence of any 
real exchange rate effect on aggregate demand, because of a zero trade balance restriction 
under capital controls. Thus the policymaker of a closed economy has to generate a 
higher inflationary shock to reduce unemployment by a given amount. 
 
Gruben and McLeod (2002) use cross section data to investigate the relationship 
between capital account openness and inflation and conclude that capital account 
openness appears to lower inflation by disciplining monetary authorities. They also point 
out that sustained removal of even one capital or current account restriction can reduce 
average annual inflation by as much as 3 per cent. 
 
In another study, Tytell and Wei (2004) study the “discipline effect” of financial 
openness on national policies. They find that financial globalization induces countries to 
pursue lower inflation rates but does not succeed in lowering the budget deficit. 
 
However, the strongest advocates of capital account liberalization recognize that 
liberalization can expose the vulnerabilities of a weak domestic financial system. To the 
extent that capital account liberalization places pressures on weak domestic banks, and to 
the extent that adequate prudential supervision is absent, liberalization can encourage 
individually rational but socially harmful activities such as excessive risk-taking and 
“gambling for redemption,” which can culminate in full-blown and costly banking crises. 
As a result, any benefits of capital account liberalization may easily be obscured by the   4
costs of the greater financial fragility it brings, especially in economies with poorly 
regulated financial sectors. More generally, one might expect the benefits of capital 
account liberalization to be more pronounced in countries characterized by a sound 
macro-economic framework and strong institutions. If this is the case, the lack of strong 
empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization may simply be due to 
the fact that previous research has not considered the role of policies and institutions in 
intermediating the effects of capital account liberalization on growth or investment. 
 
There have been several studies that have questioned the wisdom of financial 
openness, especially capital account convertibility. Rodrik (1998) looks at 100 countries 
over the period 1975-89 and concludes that there is no evidence that greater capital 
account convertibility is associated with lower inflation. Rodrik goes on to assert that in 
fact capital inflows undermine central bank’s efforts to control inflation. 
 
McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) argue for imposition of capital controls to 
reduce inflation. They point out that capital controls reduce opportunities of currency 
substitution and hence lower the interest elasticity of demand for domestic currency. This 
in turn reduces the inflation rate that is necessary to generate a given amount of 
seignorage revenue. It is interesting to note that both Bartolini and Drazen (1997) and 
McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) use the same argument to reach opposite conclusion. 
Both papers agree that a decrease in capital controls will increase the elasticity of demand 
for money by increasing opportunities of currency substitution. However, while Bartolini 
and Drazen (1997) argue that this would raise the penalty for loose monetary policy and 
hence enforce a more disciplined monetary policy, where the incentive to inflate is 
significantly lowered, McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) argue that it would raise the 
inflation rate required to generate a specific amount of seignorage revenue. 
 
Apart from the debate on the effect of capital account liberalization, another issue 
that is of associated interest is the ability of the policymaker to independently undertake 
monetary policy. With free movement of capital, countries can either adopt a fixed 
exchange rate or independent monetary policy, but not both. This is known as the 
impossible trinity or the trilemma, popularized by Robert Mundell. Thus while fixed 
exchange rates provide a credible monetary anchor it comes at a heavy price i.e. loss of 
monetary independence.  
 
Table 1 lists the countries according their exchange rate regimes in 2001. It is 
clearly evident that bulk of countries has chosen to peg their exchange rate or operate a 
crawling peg. According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002), the primary reason for this “fear 
of floating” is lack of credibility. If credibility is not conferred then the monetary 
policymaker has no authority and most outcomes are driven by expectations. There are 
several other reasons why a country might prefer a stable exchange rate. In emerging 
markets large devaluations (depreciations) tend to be associated with recessions. 
Moreover, a big decline in the exchange rate creates severe problems for external trade 
and debt servicing as they tend to be invoiced in foreign currency. In many countries 
there is a high exchange rate pass through, which results in high inflation. As a result,   5
several countries tend to use either foreign exchange reserves or interest rate as the tool to 
stabilize exchange rates.  
 
Irrespective of the stabilization variable i.e. exchange rate or interest rate, 
financial integration will increase the elasticity of money demand with respect to 
inflation. Consequently, there will be a significant reduction in the incentive of the 
policymaker to generate inflationary shock with a desire to generate seignorage revenue.  
 
Table 1: Classification of Exchange Rate Regime (2001) 
 
Code Description  No.  of 
Countries
1 No  separate  legal tender  18 
2  Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement  30 
3  Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2% 
0 
4  De facto peg  10 
5  Pre announced crawling peg  0 
6  Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
1 
7  De factor crawling peg  11 
8  De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%  22 
9  Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%  1 
10  De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%  8 
11  Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows 
for both appreciation and depreciation over time) 
1 
12 Managed  floating  22 
13 Freely  floating  9 
14 Freely  falling  4 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
 
This paper adds to the existing literature by explicitly considering the fact that the 
choice of imposing or restricting capital controls may be endogenous. First, inflation 
levels may influence the policy choice regarding the capital account. One generally 
expects countries to remove capital controls when inflation is reasonably under control. 
Thus, one would expect that any empirical results would be biased in the direction of 
finding a strong positive relationship between open capital accounts and reasonably low 
levels of inflation. Secondly, it may be difficult to accurately assess the benefits of capital 
account liberalization if capital controls are correlated with other fundamental 
determinants of inflation. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) find that open capital accounts 
are more likely to be found in countries with small public sectors and independent central 
banks. These, however, are factors, which may directly impact on inflation, thus making 
it difficult to isolate the impact of financial liberalization on inflation levels or volatility. 
This paper also takes into account the fact that inflation has shown great deal of 
persistence across a large number of countries. The paper attempts to correct for these 
econometric issues by employing static as well as dynamic panel data analyses.    6
2. Theoretical  Framework 
 
The government is made up of two branches: a fiscal authority and a monetary 
authority or the central bank. The fiscal authority issues an exogenously determined debt 
and uses the proceeds to purchase goods and services. The central bank issues currencies 
by open market operations in domestic and foreign bonds. The central bank is also 
required to monetize the fiscal debt by printing money and buying it back from the 
public. In this scenario, the real revenue that the government acquires by issuing newly 
used money to buy goods and non-money assets is referred to as “seignorage.” Thus the 
overall government welfare is increasing in the amount of seignorage revenue earned. On 
the other hand, the monetization of debt by issuing new money can potentially be 
inflationary. In most countries hyperinflations stem from the government’s need for 
seignorage revenue. The central bank is concerned about inflation as inflation has several 
costs associated with it. It results in loss of reserves in a fixed exchange rate regime and 
depreciation of the currency in a flexible exchange rate. Higher anticipated inflation 
reduces the demand for money, which is relatively costless to produce but provides 
liquidity services at the margin. Higher expected inflation sharpens random income 
distributions, degrades the allocation signals in relative prices and raises distortions, a 
non-indexed tax system inflicts on the people. We assume a quadratic cost of the 
inflation. Thus the government’s welfare function can be written as 
 
      ()
2 1
2
WS π ψπ =− ,                                           (1)  
 
whereψ is the weight that the government puts on the costs involved with increasing 
inflation, like loss of reserves or depreciation of the currency vis-à-vis the gains from 
inflation in terms of seignorage revenue. The demand for money is denoted by a Cagan 
money demand function, where nominal interest rates are dominated by nominal 
inflation. Let the money supply of the country be given by M and the price level be 
denoted by P. According to the discrete time version of the model, the demand for real 
money balances M/P is isoelastic and depends entirely on future inflation 
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  The Cagan model in its log linear stochastic form is given as 
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where  log , log mM pP ≡≡  and η is the semi-elasticity of the demand for real balances 
with respect to expected inflation. Real money balances depend on expected future 
inflation and higher expected inflation lowers the demand for real balances by raising the 
opportunity cost of holding money. Several papers such as Bartolini and Drazen (1997), 
McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) and Gruben and McLeod (2002) point out that opening 
up of the capital account leads to an increase in the elasticity of demand for money. With 
an open capital account there are increased opportunities of currency substitution. Easier   7
access to foreign currency raises the inflation elasticity of demand. Following the 
literature, it is assumed that the semi-elasticity of demand for money is related to capital 
account liberalization according to a constant elasticity relationship 
 
1 α η ξ
α
= ,                           (4)  
 
whereξ is the degree of capital account liberalization andα is the elasticity of the semi-
elasticity of demand for money with respect to capital account liberalization. A value 
ofα greater than unity implies that the semi-elasticity of demand for money is highly 
elastic with respect to capital account liberalization. In that case, a given increase in 
capital account liberalization increases the semi-elasticity of demand for money by a 
greater amount. On the other hand, if α  is less than unity then a given increase in capital 
account liberalization would increase the semi-elasticity of demand for money by a 
smaller amount. Hereξ  > 0 and α  > 0 as a result  ( ) ' n ξ  > 0. 
 
As noted by Cukierman et al. (1992a), seignorage is the amount of real 
purchasing power that a government can extract from the public by printing money. A 
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The numerator in equation (5) is the increase in nominal money supply between 
periods t and t-1, while the denominator  t P  converts this nominal increase into a flow of 
real resources to the government. However, there are limits to the real resources that the 
government can obtain by issuing money. The resulting high inflation can lead to a 
reduction in the real money balances holdings and shrinking of the tax base. As a result, 
the marginal revenue from printing money can be negative at sufficiently high levels of 
inflation. Thus there exists a seignorage maximizing money growth rate. In equilibrium, 
the rate of inflation is equal to the growth rate of money supply. We assume that money 
supply grows at a constant rateµ . With this assumption, equation (3) can be rewritten as 
 
      tt pm ηµ = + .                (6)  
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The seignorage revenue maximizing growth rate of money is given by the 
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Note that the optimal seignorage revenue maximizing rate of inflation,
s π , 
depends inversely on the capital account liberalization. Liberalizing the capital account 
leads to lowering of the seignorage revenue maximizing rate of inflation. Using the 
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Figure 2 depicts the change in the government’s welfare as the inflation rate and 
the degree of capital account liberalization is changed. We evaluate the government 
welfare for different combinations of π  between 0.05 and 0.5 andξ  between 0.05 and 2. 
We restrict the numerical analysis to two values of ψ  and α . It  can  be  seen  that  when  
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the central bank is moderately concerned about stabilizing inflation, ( 0.5 ψ = ), the 
welfare increase monotonically with inflation. On the other hand, if the central bank is 
excessively concerned about inflation, ( 2 ψ = ), the overall government welfare increases 
till inflation rate of 0.3 and falls subsequently. At high rates of inflation, the overall 
welfare turns negative. However, in either case, for any given rate of inflation, the 
welfare decreases with the extent of capital account liberalization. 
 
The rate at which the government’s welfare decreases with capital account 
liberalization depends upon the parameterα . The decrease in the welfare is much more 
prominent at higher rates of inflation. Thus in countries with high inflation rate, capital 
account liberalization would reduce more rapidly the incentive for the government to 
impose inflation tax. The government solves the following optimaility condition to obtain 
the optimal inflation rate that maximizes its overall welfare 
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.          (10)   
From the above optimality condition, one obtains a relationship between the 
optimal inflation and the extent of capital account liberalization. Using the implicit 
function theorem we get 
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Since it is difficult to assign a sign to the above function analytically, we resort to 
numerical methods. Figure 3 displays the results of the numerical analysis. We again 
evaluate the sign of the above derivative for different combinations ofπ andξ .  
 
Figure 3: Impact of Capital Account Liberalization on Inflation 
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Across the entire range of π andξ  considered, the derivative has a negative sign. Thus 
the optimal inflation is negatively related to the extent of capital account liberalization. 
The rate of inflation that maximizes government welfare,
w π  falls with opening of the 
capital account. 
 
3. Empirical  Analysis   
 
In this section we use cross-country panel data for 163 countries over the period 
1980-2003 to test the prediction of the theory that inflation will be lower in countries that 
have liberalized their capital account. We consider the log of average inflation instead of 
the level of inflation as a few countries in the sample have extremely high average 
inflation rates. Thus the parameter estimates from a regression would be determined by a 
handful of observations. We use the Chinn-Ito index, developed by Chinn and Ito (2005), 
to measure capital account liberalization. The index is the first principal component of the 
binary variables pertaining to cross border financial transactions, based on the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This is a compilation 
of four dichotomous variables accounting for restrictions on capital account transaction, 
current account transactions, requiring surrendering of export proceeds, and the presence 
of multiple exchange rates. Since these four binary variables account for the degree of 
control than openness, Chinn and Ito flip their values and construct an index based on the 
standardized principal components. The index ranges from −1.7 to 2.7 and a higher value 
of the index indicates greater financial openness. We measure financial globalization with 
a de jure measure instead of a de facto one. We want to study the signaling and discipline 
effect of capital account liberalization on inflation and a de jure measure is more 
appropriate. 
 
In addition, we use several other control variables that have been found in the 
literature as being principal determinants of inflation. The first control variable is a 
measure of real income per capita, which acts as a measure of the overall development of 
the economy and captures a wide range of factors that affect average inflation. Owing to 
the large variation in this variable across the sample of countries, the log of real per 
capita GDP instead of level is used.  
 
Countries with high fiscal deficit are also associated with high inflation. This can 
be due to two reasons. First, if large fiscal deficit is associated with increased government 
spending, it will increase aggregate demand and result in higher inflation. Secondly, if the 
government is financing its spending by borrowing from the public, inflation will reduce 
the burden of debt and redistribute wealth towards the government. While data on per 
capita GDP have been obtained from World Development Indicators, data on budget 
deficit have been taken from Government Finance Statistics.  
 
Several other factors have been known to influence the level of inflation in a 
country. Primary among them is the level of independence that the central bank enjoys. 
Intuitively, a less independent central bank is associated with a higher rate of inflation. 
,   11
Central bank independence refers to the obligations of the central bank regarding 
financing the budget deficit through money creation and/or interest rate manipulation. 
The freer the central bank is from this point of view, the lower is the inflation rate. A less 
free central bank will be forced to introduce inflationary shocks to generate seignorage 
revenue to finance the budget deficit. Moreover, a less free central bank is unable to 
precommit to its policy choices, which results in higher inflation. Cukierman et al. 
(1992b) empirically show that inflation is higher in countries with low central bank 
independence. De facto central bank independence is controlled using the turnover rate of 
central bank governor from Ghosh et al. (2003). A high turnover of the governor implies 
a low independence from the government and should be associated with higher inflation 
rates. The index goes from 0 to 1.4, with countries like Bolivia and Costa Rica having 
least independent central banks. 
 
The level of inflation is also affected by the extent of political stability that a 
country enjoys. Cukierman et al. (1992a) show that inflation will be higher in countries, 
which are politically unstable because the policymaker lacks the ability to precommit. 
We use the political stability index developed by Intra Country Risk Guide. The index is 
made up of variables like government stability, socio-economic conditions, conflicts, law 
and order, etc. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with a higher number indicating a more 
politically stable regime.  
 
Fixed exchange rates are associated with low inflation as they serve as a nominal 
anchor for the monetary policy. Fixed exchange rate also imposes a discipline effect, as 
the political costs of abandoning the peg result in tighter policies. To control for 
exchange rate regimes, we use the exchange rate index formulated by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002), which is based on market determined exchange rates rather than official 
exchange rates. The index ranges from 1 to 15 with a higher number implying a more 
flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
The final control variable is trade openness. Trade openness is calculated as the 
share of imports in GDP. Romer (1993) shows that there exists a significant negative 
relationship between trade openness and inflation. Generally, inflation leads to real 
exchange rate depreciation and the harms of depreciation are greater in more open 
economies. As a result, the government has lower incentive in open economies to 
introduce surprise inflationary shock. Data on trade openness have been obtained from 
World Development Indicators. Finally, we include a dummy variable for the Latin 
American countries as countries in this region have behaved very differently compared to 
other regions. The empirical model is given by following equation 
 
0 1 12 23 34 45 56 67 7 it it it it it it it it i it Y XXXXXXX v α ββ ββ βββ ε = + +++++++ + . (12)   
 
where i refers to the country and t represents the time period. Here Y is the dependent 
variable, measured as log of inflation. Among the explanatory variable, X1 is the main 
variable of interest, i.e. capital account liberalization, X2 is log of per capita GDP, X3 is 
the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, X4 is a measure of exchange rate regime, X5 
is the degree of political stability, X6 is a measure of central bank dependence and X7 is 
a measure of trade openness.   12
A large econometric literature, including Nelson and Plosser (1992), Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995) and Pivetta and Reis (2004), has found that post-war inflation in the United 
States and other industrial countries exhibits high persistence. Other works like Baum et 
al. (1999) and Francisco and Bleaney (2005) have looked at developing countries and 
have found evidence for persistent inflation. In our sample of 163 countries, a Woolridge 
test for auto-correlation, suggests the presence of first order serial correlation. In the 
presence of auto-correlation, the error term in equation 12 can be written as 
 
1 it i it it u ε ρε − = +       
 
In the literature, there are several ways to estimate the model in the presence of 
serial correlation. One can use a feasible GLS with AR1 correlation. However, this 
procedure has been criticized for underestimating the standard errors. The panel corrected 
standard error estimates, which uses Prais-Winstein regression, addresses this problem. It 
assumes that the disturbances are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated 
across panels. The panel corrected standard error estimates allow for first order 
correlation, AR(1), with a common coefficient of the AR(1) process across all the panels, 
(, i i ρ ρ =∀ ), as well as a specific coefficient of the AR(1) process for each panel, 
( , ij ij ρ ρ ≠∀ ≠ ).  
 
When auto-correlation with common coefficient of correlation is specified, the 
common correlation coefficient is computed as 
 







where i ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient for country i and m is the number of countries. 
 
Table 2 displays the results of the Prais-Winstein regression with a common auto-
correlation coefficient, while Table 3 considers the case of panel specific coefficients. All 
the specifications have a dummy variable for Latin American countries, which has not 
been reported. The results are broadly similar. The data supports the prediction of the 
theoretical model. Capital account openness is highly significant across all specifications 
thereby implying a statistically significant negative relationship between capital account 
openness and inflation. In column (II), we add per capita GDP to the regression. The 
coefficient on per capita GDP across different specification suggests that higher real per 
capita income is significantly associated with a lower level of inflation. We find that 
central government budget deficit is not a significant predictor of inflation. On the other 
hand, the exchange rate regimes show up as a very strong and significant predictor of 
inflation across all specifications. 
 
Central bank dependence shows up with the expected positive sign indicating that 
countries with highly dependent central bank are characterized by higher inflation. The 
results also show that countries, which are politically stable, are associated with lower 
inflation. However, when we control for central bank dependence as well as political 
stability, only central bank dependence shows up as a significant predictor.  Finally, we 
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Table 2: Prais-Winstein Estimates with Common Auto-Correlation Coefficient 
 
 
I   II   III   IV   V   VI   VII   VIII  
Constant   1.872***   3.090***   3.126*** 2.261*** 3.277*** 2.053***   3.103***   3.145*** 




-0.270***  -0.218***  -0.204*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.239***   -0.248***   -0.240*** 
  [8.06]   [6.21]   [5.67]  [5.69]  [5.33]  [5.15]   [5.21]   [4.93] 
Log of Per 
Capita GDP  
 
-0.148***   -0.154*** -0.116** -0.224*** -0.035    -0.177*   -0.183** 




-0.002 0  0.012*  -0.005   0.007   0.008 
     [0.26] [0.02] [1.69] [0.67]    [0.86]    [0.97] 
Exchange 
Rate Regime  
   
0.081*** 0.070*** 0.088***   0.078***   0.077*** 
       [7.00] [7.29] [6.70]    [5.89]    [5.95] 
Political 
Stability  
     
-0.010**   -0.006   -0.005 




    
0.720*** 
 
0.628***   0.660*** 
       [3.95]   [3.43]    [3.62] 
Trade 
Openness  
       
-0.001 
          [ 0 . 3 2 ]  
No. of 
Observations   2987   2780   2628  1999  1353  1375   994   981 
No. of 
Countries   160   145   137  110  83  91   73   72 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *indicates significant at 10% 
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Table 3: Prais-Winstein Estimates with Country Specific Auto-Correlation Coefficient 
 
 
I   II   III   IV   V   VI   VII   VIII  
Constant   1.841***   2.999***   3.022*** 2.178*** 3.211*** 1.889***   2.869*** 2.983*** 




-0.238***   -0.187***   -0.175*** -0.185*** -0.209*** -0.221***   -0.242*** -0.222*** 
  [9.25]   [6.95]   [6.07]  [5.32]  [5.28]  [5.43]   [5.63]  [5.47] 
Log of Per 
Capita GDP  
 
-0.141***   -0.145*** -0.110** -0.220*** -0.018    -0.149* -0.156* 




0.002 0.001  0.012* -0.002   0.005  0.006 
     [0.40] [0.21] [1.86] [0.34]    [0.65] [0.76] 
Exchange 
Rate Regime  
   
0.079*** 0.071*** 0.093***   0.081*** 0.081*** 
       [8.01] [8.39] [7.83]    [5.78] [5.82] 
Political 
Stability  
     
-0.011***   -0.007* -0.006 








         [3.22]   [2.50] [2.65] 
Trade 
Openness  
       
-0.003* 
          [ 1 . 8 8 ]  
No. of 
Observations   2987   2780   2628  1999  1353  1375   994  981 
No. of 
Countries   160   145   137  110  83  91   73  72 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *indicates significant at 10%   15
find that there is a small but significant negative relationship between trade openness and 
inflation, if it is assumed that the countries are characterized by different degrees of 
persistence.  
 
The impact of capital account openness on inflation could be magnified or 
mitigated by quality of institutions. Countries with weak institutions, like political 
instability and dependent central bank, suffer from a pre-commitment problem due to 
lack of credibility. In these countries, opening up the capital account is seen as a step to 
build credibility. By signaling that it is increasing the penalties of excess money creation, 
the central bank is able to alter the expectations of the private sector. As a result, one can 
expect the negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation to be 
greater in these countries. To test this possibility, we rank the countries in our sample 
according to the average political stability and central bank dependence index. We then 
identify the countries with least stable political regime and most dependent central banks. 
Table 4 reports the regression results based on this sample of relatively politically 
unstable countries and countries with more dependent central banks. 
 
The results indicate that in countries with weak institutions, the magnitude of the 
relationship between capital account openness and inflation is significantly higher than 
the overall sample. Thus opening the capital account in these countries yields significant 
benefits in terms of reduced inflation.  
 
Another way to explain the persistence in inflation is by introducing lagged value 
of the variable on the right hand side.
2 With the presence of lagged dependent variable, 
complications arise in the estimation of the model using least square methods. In this case 
the lagged dependent variable tends to be correlated with the error term. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) develop a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that solves this 
problem. First differencing equation 12 removes the i v and produces an equation that can 
be estimated using instrumental variables. 
 
  11 22 33 44 55 66 77 it it it it it it it it it DY DX DX DX DX DX DX DX β ββββββµ =+++++++ .  (12) 
   
where D is the first difference operator. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator 
uses lagged levels of the dependent variable and the predetermined variables and the 
differences of the strictly exogenous variables as instruments. A variable it x  is said to be 
strictly exogenous if  [ ] 0 it is Exε =  for all t and s. If  [ ] 0 it is Exε ≠ for s≤ t but 
[ ] 0 it is Exε =  for all s > t, the variable is said to be endogenous. Intuitively, if the error 
term at time t has some feedback on the subsequent realizations of it x , then it x is an 
endogenous variable. 
 
As pointed out earlier, the choice of imposing capital controls may be 
endogenous. Inflation levels influence the policy choice regarding the capital account. 
One generally expects countries to remove capital controls when inflation is reasonably 
 
                                                  
2    A theoretical explanation of the presence of lagged inflation is provided in papers like Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995), Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).   16
 
Table 4: Subsample Prais-Winstein Estimates with Country Specific Auto-Correlation Coefficient 
 
  Politically Unstable Countries  Countries with Dependent Central Banks 
  I   II   III   IV   V   VI   VII   VIII   IX  X 
Constant   2.54*** 2.05* 2.21** 1.42 1.34  4.68** 2.23 1.80 1.07 -0.80
 [2.83] [1.95] [2.29] [1.23] [1.16]  [2.45] [0.80] [0.80] [0.34] [0.32]
Capital Account Openness   -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.21** -0.24*** -0.28** -0.23*
 [3.66] [2.94] [3.73] [2.87] [2.97]  [3.10] [2.19] [2.88] [2.45] [1.72]
Log of Per Capita GDP   -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01  -0.39* -0.11 0.06 0.01 0.28
 [1.20] [0.54] [0.61] [0.05] [2.40]  [1.82] [0.33] [0.21] [0.02] [0.88]
Budget Deficit   0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
 [1.88] [1.82] [0.83] [0.60] [0.78]  [0.51] [0.10] [0.60] [0.35] [0.03]
Exchange Rate Regime   0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.11***
 [5.05] [5.46] [5.90] [6.10] [6.22]  [3.55] [3.72] [3.24] [3.84] [4.40]
Political Stability   -0.01* 0.00 0.00  -0.02** 0.00 0.00
 [1.73] [0.48] [0.67]  [2.54] [0.68] [0.47]
Central Bank Dependence   0.19 0.19 0.24  0.55** 0.60 0.70*
 [1.00] [0.89] [1.12]  [2.19] [1.56] [1.89]
Trade Openness   0.00  -0.03*
  [0.92] [1.74]
No. of Observations   628 566 522 460 459  384 314 273 239 227
No. of Countries   34 34 34 34 34  23 23 19 19 18
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *indicates significant at 10%   17
under control. The unforecastable errors today might affect future changes in capital 
account liberalization and hence this variable is not strictly exogenous but endogenous. Its 
lagged values two periods are used as instruments.  
 
Another possible endogenous variable is the exchange rate regime. Generally, 
higher inflation can trigger a switch in an exchange rate regime. The regime switch can 
take place in both directions. Higher inflation makes a peg less convenient. Either the peg 
has to be adjusted very frequently or there is great deal of fluctuation in the real exchange 
rate. Higher inflation can also make a departure from a float more likely. Countries with 
severe inflationary problems frequently adopt a peg as a highly visible nominal anchor in a 
stabilization attempt. Thus in the subsequent analysis, capital account liberalization and 
exchange rate are treated as endogenous variables. 
 
Table 5: Arellano Bond Estimates with Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
  I   II   III   IV   V   VI  
D.Lagged Inflation   0.436***  0.447***  0.449***  0.488***  0.520***   0.505*** 
  [8.20]   [7.81]   [8.31]   [7.83]   [7.38]   [6.97]  
D2.Lagged Inflation   0.109***  0.102**   0.074*   0.073   0.034   0.026  
  [3.10]   [2.55]   [1.82]   [1.37]   [0.60]   [0.45]  
D.Capital Account Openness   -0.248***  -0.293***  -0.154***  -0.109**   -0.128**   -0.150*** 
  [-3.38]   [-3.74]   [-3.15]   [-1.97]   [-2.18]   [-2.78]  
D.Log of Per Capita GDP   -1.180***  -0.952**   -1.135***  -0.776***  -0.735**   -0.886**  
  [-3.14]   [-2.32]   [-3.64]   [-2.70]   [-2.08]   [-2.36]  
D.Budget Deficit     -0.010   -0.007   0.000   0.000   -0.001  
    [-1.26]   [-1.00]   [-0.01]   [-0.00]   [-0.14]  
D.Exchange Rate Regime       0.073***  0.083***  0.081***   0.079*** 
      [3.81]   [3.68]   [3.40]   [3.29]  
D.Central Bank Dependence         0.316**   0.381**   0.375**  
        [2.09]   [2.47]   [2.40]  
D.Political Stability           0.001   -0.000  
       [0.13]    [-0.05]   
D.Trade  Openness         0.011   
        [1.55]   
No. of Observations   2091   1896   1480   1052   841   833  
No. of Countries   143   133   108   79   69   68  
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *indicates significant at 10% 
 
The estimation results of the model described above using the method of difference-
GMM are shown in Table 5. The dependent variable is the first difference (D) of Log 
Inflation and the explanatory variables are in first difference as well. The results reported in 
Table 5 shows that even after accounting for the observed persistence in inflation and 
endogeneity of capital account liberalization and exchange rate regimes, the hypothesis that 
opening up the capital account leads to lower inflation holds and the effects are significant 
and sizeable across all specifications. An increase in capital account openness index of 0.1 
unit decreases the inflation rate by as much as 2.9 per cent. Thus, if the inflation is at its 
sample mean of 58.15 per cent, opening up of the capital account will reduce it by 1.68 per 
cent to 56.46 per cent. 
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Among other explanatory variables, per capita GDP, exchange rate regimes and 
central bank dependence continue to have significant impact on inflation in the expected 
direction. However, trade openness and political stability no longer affect inflation in a 
significant way. Finally, as before, budget deficit has no impact on inflation.  
 
Next, we divide the entire sample of countries on the basis of inflation, income and 
indebtedness. From Table 6, we find that the negative relationship between capital account 
openness and inflation is three times stronger in high inflation countries than low inflation 
countries and twice as stronger than the entire sample. Column (III) and (IV) of Table 6 
indicate that the coefficient for high income countries is not statistically significant while 
that for low income countries is highly significant. Thus the overall negative relationship 
between opening of capital account and inflation is primarily driven by low income 
countries. 
 
Table 6: Subsample Results using Arellano Bond Estimates 
 
  Inflation   Income   Indebtedness  
  High Low   High Low   High Low  
  I   II   III   IV   V   VI  
D.Lagged Inflation   0.790***  0.357***  0.564***  0.472***  0.587***   0.413*** 
 [10.04]  [5.29]  [4.48]  [5.97]  [5.90]    [5.53] 
D2.Lagged Inflation   -0.335***  0.076*  0.019  0.004  -0.005   0.008 
 [3.94]  [1.75]  [0.21]  [0.06]  [0.06]    [0.12] 
D.Capital Account Openness   -0.362***  -0.088*  -0.023  -0.165**  -0.156**   -0.014 
 [-3.08]  [-1.71]  [-0.40]  [-2.43]  [-2.41]    [-0.23] 
D.Log of Per Capita GDP   -3.451***  -0.967***  -1.163**  -0.727*  -0.788*   -0.837** 
 [-2.99]  [-2.74]  [-2.28]  [-1.69]  [-1.70]    [-2.46] 
D.Budget Deficit   -0.022  0.007  0.004  -0.004  -0.007   0.006 
 [-0.89]  [0.90]  [0.40]  [-0.26]  [-0.55]    [0.60] 
D.Exchange Rate Regime   0.080*  0.059***  0.117***  0.038*  0.073***   0.076*** 
 [1.93]  [2.65]  [3.34]  [1.84]  [2.69]    [2.64] 
D.Central Bank Dependence   1.060***  0.504***  0.427**  0.471**  0.395**   0.463** 
 [3.69]  [3.21]  [2.06]  [2.45]  [2.30]    [2.55] 
D.Political Stability   0.003  0.002  0.008  -0.006  -0.002   -0.003 
  [0.38]  [0.38]  [1.27]  [-1.10]   [-0.43]   [-0.66] 
D.Trade Openness   0.011  0.016  0.004  0.021*  0.009   0.015 
 [1.58]  [1.54]  [0.49]  [1.93]  [1.09]    [1.33] 
No. of Observations   125  708  474  359  494   339 
No. of Countries   11  57  40  28  38   30 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *indicates significant at 10% 
 
Finally column (V) and (VI) show that, the negative relationship is also 
significantly strong for highly indebted countries. A country that is faced with an external 
debt can raise the resources to pay the debt either externally or internally. It can raise the 
resources externally in two different ways. It could undertake a devaluation, which would 
make its exports more competitive and generate a trade surplus. Alternatively, it could open 
up the capital account by removing capital controls on foreign investment. This will pave 
the way for a more efficient allocation of savings and increase the country’s attractiveness   19
to foreign investors. The resulting higher growth rate and accumulation of reserves will 
provide the economy with resources to service the debt. However, if the economy is closed 
then the government will have to raise the resources internally. This implies that resources 
will have to be transferred from the private sector to the government. If inflation tax is the 
major mechanism for this transfer then it will result in a higher inflation. 
 
4.  Capital Account Liberalization: Indian Experience 
 
  Having theoretically and empirically looked at the relationship between opening up 
of the capital account and inflation, it would be instructive to look at the issues currently 
facing India.  In March of last year, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh floated the idea 
of revisiting full capital account convertibility. With a comfortable external and internal 
position it was time to see if full capital account convertibility was a viable option. Since 
then a high level committee was set up by the Reserve Bank of India under the 
chairmanship of Mr. S.S. Tarapore to establish a framework for fuller capital account 
convertibility. The committee submitted its report, Tarapore (2006), on July 31, 2006 and 
took the view that there is already an ongoing process of capital account liberalization and 
the report was aimed at deepening this.  
 
In India also capital account liberalization has exercised some degree of 
“disciplinary effect” on the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).  India had a history of tight 
controls on current and capital payments till the 1990s. However, since then it has taken 
major strides to liberalize transactions on these accounts. It accepted Article VIII status, 
requiring current account convertibility in August 1994. Moreover, since the mid 90s, India 
has slowly but steadily moved towards greater capital account convertibility. The RBI 
undertook several steps to ease the flow of capital once the initial problems related to the 
Asian crises were overcome. In recent years a large number of restrictions on capital flows 
have been removed.
3 During this time, the policy endeavor of the RBI has been to keep 
year on year inflation at a low level. Though India does not follow a specific inflation 
target, the RBI keeps a strict vigilance over inflation and especially inflation expectations. 
Through several speeches, notifications and press releases, the RBI has made its preference 
for anchoring inflation expectations clear. For e.g. in the First Quarter Review of Annual 
Statement on Monetary Policy for 2006-07, it was pointed out that the overall monetary 
stance would be to ensure a monetary and interest rate environment that enables 
continuation of the growth momentum while emphasizing price stability with a view to 
anchoring inflation expectations. The recent hike in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) by 50 
basis points was aimed at reducing excess liquidity and curbing inflation expectations. One 
major reason for the concern about inflation expectation is the threat of capital outflow in 
the face of loose monetary policy and high inflation. A causal observation of the scatter 
plot of inflation rate against share of capital flows in GDP, in Figure 4, shows a strong 
negative relationship between the two, indicating the “discipline effect”. Moreover, it can 
be seen that India has been moving down the line of fit i.e. moving away from a closed 
                                                  
3    Shah and Patnaik (2005) provide a list of steps that were taken to ease restrictions on capital account 
from 1992 to 2004.    20
capital account and high inflation regime to relatively more open capital account and low 
inflation regime.  
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However, there are still several challenges that India faces for a successful move 
towards capital account convertibility. Even Tarapore (1997) had pointed out certain 
preconditions that needed to be satisfied before moving to capital account convertibility. 
These included lowering the gross fiscal deficit, keeping inflation rate between 3 and 5 
percent and reducing the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and the non performing assets (NPAs). 
The general consensus is that while India has achieved the targets for inflation and NPAs, it 
has not made adequate progress on reduction of CRR and fiscal discipline.
4 
 
  This section looks at another challenge that the monetary authority will face with 
further opening up of the capital account, which is the choice of the exchange rate regime. 
Officially, India’s exchange rate is “market determined” i.e. the exchange rate is 
determined in the currency market and not administratively determined. However, the RBI 
actively intervenes in the currency market with the stated objective of “containing 
volatility”. Papers like Patnaik (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) point out that India 
                                                  
4   Kletzer (2004) and Williamson (2006), among others analyze India’s performance on these indicators in 
detail.   
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has allowed limited currency volatility over the period 1979-2003. Capital controls allowed 
the simultaneous pursuit of exchange rate stability and independent monetary policy. 
However, with free capital flows, the government can not independently set interest rates as 
well as resist exchange rate movements.  
 
The adoption of greater capital account convertibility presumes the adoption of 
flexible exchange rate system and independent monetary policy. The exchange rate acts as 
a shock absorber to external shocks. However, leaving the exchange rate to be decided by 
market forces can prove to be detrimental to the growth rate of an economy, especially if 
the growth is driven by exports. Dooley et al. (2003) point out that the growing stockpiles 
of international reserves can be attributed to a deliberate strategy, which facilitates growth 
by maintaining an undervalued exchange rate. This would imply that every time there is a 
pressure on the domestic currency to appreciate i.e. traders want to sell foreign currency 
and buy domestic currency; the Central Bank intervenes by printing domestic currency and 
buying up all the foreign currency, which translates into additional reserves. In recent years 
India has experienced a massive accumulation of international reserves. Patnaik (2003) 
points out that in India, reserve accumulation has been a passive consequence of an 
exchange rate policy aimed at preventing the exchange rate from rising.  
 
  A relatively weak rupee has helped India to achieve significant export led growth in 
the recent past. As such it might be a mistake to allow the exchange rate to be pushed up to 
uncompetitive levels owing to market pressure, especially when competing countries like 
China are resisting pressure to have a stronger currency. This would result in lower growth, 
higher unemployment and loss of competitiveness for India. However, undervalued 
exchange rate can not work in the long run as an engine of export led growth. In the long 
run export led growth has to be based on higher productivity.  
 
Tarapore (2006) recommended the introduction of a Monitoring Exchange Rate 
Band of +/- 5.0 per cent around the neutral real effective exchange rate (REER). By doing 
so, the RBI will be giving up the control of monetary policy to an extent, which is not the 
optimal thing to do, especially in the face of external shocks and diverse macroeconomic 
experience of other countries. Historically exchange rate bands have not been very 
successful as can be seen from the failure of the European Monetary System. Moreover, 
with free capital flows, exit from a relatively fixed exchange rate, in the face of adverse 
shocks, can be costly in terms of output and welfare, as was observed by countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Russia in recent past.  
 
The primary instrument for managing capital flows in India has been sterilization. 
The impact of rising foreign exchange assets on monetary base has been neutralized 
through open market sales of government securities. However, there is an interest cost 
associated with such sterilization, which is the spread between the interest on domestic 
government bonds and the yield of reserves. Tarapore (2006) estimates such cost to be to 
the tune of Rs. 4000 crores in 2005-06. Moreover, excess accumulation of reserves, which 
is a consequence of the exchange rate regime, can prove to be counterproductive in the 
longer run. Excess accumulation of reserves imply that funds are being diverted towards   22
foreign currency assets, with low but stable yields, instead of being used to augment the 
capital stock of the economy.     
 
Thus, given the above issues, it is imperative that the issue of appropriate exchange 





This paper investigates the relationship between capital account openness and 
inflation. Using the Cagan money demand relationship, the paper builds a theoretical 
model, which predicts that opening up the capital account will lower inflation. Thereafter 
using both dynamic and static panel data estimators, on a sample covering 163 countries 
analyzed in the period from 1980 to 2003, this paper finds that a higher degree of capital 
account openness generates lower inflation rates. A breakdown of the sample indicates that 
the negative relationship is significant in countries that are characterized by lower political 
stability and countries with more dependent central banks. The paper also finds that the 
overall negative relationship is also driven by high inflation, low income and highly 
indebted countries. 
 
The spate of financial crises in Latin America and Asia in the last two decades has 
led many to question the benefits of capital account liberalization. Rodrik (1998) succinctly 
sums up the skeptics’ view: “Enshrining capital account convertibility in the IMF’s articles 
of agreement is an idea whose time has not yet come. We have no evidence it will solve any 
of our problems, and some reason to think it will make them worse.” Despite these 
warnings the last two decades witnessed a concerted effort towards capital account 
liberalization. This paper tries to identify one potentially important benefit of such 
liberalization. Capital account openness appears to discipline monetary authorities, or to 
help them convince the private sector that they will be more disciplined in the future.  
 
Focusing on India, the paper finds that the opening up of the capital account since 
mid 90s did have a “disciplinary effect” on the RBI as the RBI has kept a strict vigilance 
over inflation and inflation expectations. However, for a move to greater capital account 
convertibility certain pre-conditions need to be fulfilled like fiscal discipline and reduction 
in CRR. The paper also identifies the appropriate choice of an exchange rate regime as an 
important issue that needs to addressed and resolved before a move towards the greater 
account convertibility. While the existing exchange rate regime has its benefits in terms of 
inducing export led growth, there are several costs associated with it and it would become 
unsustainable after greater integration with the global capital markets. 
    23
References 
 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 58; pp. 277–297. 
 
Bartolini, L. and A. Drazen (1997). “Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal.” American 
Economic Review, 87; pp. 138–54. 
  
Baum, C., J. Barkoulas, and M. Caglayan (1999). “Persistence in International Inflation 
Rates.” Southern Economic Journal, 65; pp. 900–913.  
 
Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart, (2002), "Fear Of Floating," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 107, pp. 379-408. 
 
Chinn, M. and H. Ito (2005). “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, 
Institutions and Interactions.” Journal of Development Economics. 
  
Cukierman, A., S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini (1992a). “Seigniorage and Political 
Instability.” American Economic Review, 82; pp. 537–55. 
 
Cukierman, A., B. Neyapti, and S. Webb (1992b). “Measuring the Independence of Central 
Banks and its Effect on Policy Outcomes.” World Bank Economic Review, 6; pp. 
353–398. 
 
Dooley, M., D. Folkerts-Landau, and P. Garber (2003). “An Essay on The Revived Bretton 
Woods System.” NBER Working Paper No. 9971. 
 
Francisco, M. and M. Bleaney (2005). “Inflation Persistence and Exchange Rate Regimes: 
Evidence from Developing Countries.” Economic Policies Research Unit Working 
Paper. 
 
Fuhrer, J. and G. Moore (1995). “Inflation Persistence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
110 (1); pp. 127–159.  
 
Gali, J. and M. Gertler (1999). “Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 44 (2); pp. 195–222.  
 
Ghosh, A.R., A.-M. Gulde, and H. C. Wolf (2003). “Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and 
Consequences,” MIT Press., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1st edition.  
 
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini (1991). “Political and Monetary Institutions 
and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries.” Economic Policy, 6 (13); 
pp. 341–392. 
   24
Grilli, V. and G. Milesi-Ferretti (1995). “Economic Effects and Structural Determinants of 
Capital Controls.” IMF Staff Papers, 42 (3). 
 
Gruben, W. and D. McLeod (2002). “Capital Account Liberalization and Inflation.” 
Economic Letters, 77 (2); pp. 221–225. 
 
Kletzer, K. (2004). “Liberalizing Capital Flows in India: Financial Repression, 
Macroeconomic Policy and Gradual Reforms.” Santa Cruz Center for International 
Economics Paper 04-16. 
 
Kose, M., E. Prasad, K. Rogoff, and S. Wei (2006). “Financial Globalization: A 
Reappraisal.” NBER Working Paper 12484. 
 
McKinnon, R.I. and D.J. Mathieson (1981). “How to Manage a Repressed Economy?” 
Essays in International Finance. 
 
Nelson, C. and C. Plosser (1992). “Trends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic Time 
Series: Some Evidence and Implications.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 10; pp. 
129–162. 
 
Patnaik, I. (2003). ‘Indias Policy Stance on Reserves and the Currency.’ ICRIER Working 
Paper No. 108 
 
Patnaik, I. (2005). “India’s Experience with Pegged Exchange Rate.” In S. Berry, B. 
Bosworth, and A. Panagariya, eds., ‘The India Policy Forum 2004,’ pp. 189–226. 
Brookings Institution Press and NCAER. 
 
Pivetta, F. and R. Reis (2004). “The Persistence of Inflation in the United States.” 
Unpublished. 
 
Razin, A. and C.-W. Yuen (1995). “Can Capital Controls Alter the Inflation- 
Unemployment Tradeoff?” NBER Working Paper No. 5239.  
 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2002).  “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: 
A Reinterpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (1); pp. 1–48. 
 
Rodrik, D. (1998). “Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility?” In S. Fisher, ed., “Should 
the IMF Pursue Capital-Account Convertibility?,” Princeton University.  
 
Romer, D. (1993). “Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 108 (4); pp. 869–903. 
 
Shah, A. and I. Patnaik (2005). “India’s Experience with Capital Flows: The Elusive Quest 
for a Sustainable Current Account Deficit.” NBER Working Paper No. 11387. 
   25
Tarapore S.S. (1997). “Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility”, 
Reserve Bank of India.   
 
Tarapore, S.S. (2006). “Report of the Committee on Fuller Capital Account 
Convertibility.” Reserve Bank of India 
 
Tytell, I. and S. Wei (2004). “Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic 
Policies?” IMF Working Paper No. 04/84.  
 
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. 
Princeton University Press, 1st edition. 
 
Williamson, J. (2006). “Why Capital Account Convertibility in India is Premature.” 
Economic and Political Weekly,  May 13 
 
   26
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: List of Countries 
 
Afghanistan   Albania   Algeria   Angola   Antigua & Barbuda  
Argentina   Armenia   Aruba   Australia   Austria  
Azerbaijan   Bahamas, The   Bahrain   Bangladesh   Barbados  
Belgium   Belize   Benin   Bhutan   Bolivia  
Botswana   Brazil   Bulgaria   Burkina Faso   Burundi  
Cambodia   Cameroon   Canada   Cape Verde   CAR  
Chad   Chile   China   Colombia   Comoros  
Congo, DR   Congo, Rep.   Costa Rica   Cote d’Ivoire   Cyprus  
Denmark   Djibouti   Dominica   Dominican Republic   Ecuador  
Egypt   El Salvador   Equatorial Guinea   Ethiopia   Fiji  
Finland   France   Gabon   Gambia, The   Georgia  
Germany   Ghana   Greece   Grenada   Guatemala  
Guinea   Guinea-Bissau   Guyana   Haiti   Honduras  
Hong Kong   Hungary   Iceland   India   Indonesia  
Iran  Iraq   Ireland   Israel   Italy  
Jamaica   Japan   Jordan   Kenya   Kiribati  
Korea, Rep.   Kuwait   Lao PDR   Lebanon   Lesotho  
Liberia   Libya   Macedonia   Madagascar   Malawi  
Malaysia   Maldives   Mali   Malta   Mauritania  
Mauritius   Mexico   Micronesia   Moldova   Mongolia  
Morocco   Mozambique   Myanmar   Namibia   Nepal  
Netherlands   Netherlands Antilles   New Zealand   Nicaragua   Niger  
Nigeria   Norway   Oman   Pakistan   Panama  
Papua New Guinea   Paraguay   Peru   Philippines   Poland  
Portugal   Qatar   Romania   Russia   Rwanda  
Samoa   Sao Tome and Principe   Saudi Arabia   Senegal   Seychelles  
Sierra Leone   Singapore   Solomon Islands   Somalia   South Africa  
Spain   Sri Lanka   St. Kitts and Nev.   St. Lucia   St. Vin and Gren  
Sudan   Suriname   Swaziland   Sweden   Switzerland  
Syria   Tanzania   Thailand   Togo   Tonga  
Trinidad and Tobago   Tunisia   Turkey   Uganda   UAE  
United Kingdom   United States   Uzbekistan   Vanuatu   Venezuela  
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